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Abstract: Does diversity include children?  The Philosophy for Children movement shows children are capable of 
rational argument, including philosophical debate. Yet children who argue skillfully with their peers and adult 
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evidence and methods of persuasion could permit children and adults to participate as equals in reasoned discussions 
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1. Introduction 
When we consider groups of diverse individuals coming together to reason, we typically 
picture adults, coming to the discussion with some experience in reasoning. They may or may 
not be open to changing their reasoning practices to suit the group, depending on their particular 
background culture, academic discipline, or social practices.  However, we recognize that their 
previous reasoning experience may justify their reluctance to change their ways, and we may 
proceed with appropriate caution in introducing standards and practices that are new to some 
members of the group.  We don’t typically exercise this same caution with children.   
Children are presumed not to bring any extensive experience to reasoning.  They acquire 
experience during their upbringing and education, and it is an open question what experience 
they should acquire.  Should they learn to defer to authority?  Should they learn to adopt the 
practices of their parents and teachers?  Should they learn to think independently of the adults 
around them?   
Since we operate in a North American context in which it is presumed children should learn 
to reason with some measure of independence, the question is what this reasoning should look 
like and how the education should proceed.  Our aim is to use children as a test case for whether 
people should be acculturated to standard practices of reasoning, or whether practices should also 
be understood to emerge from each community of reasoners in accordance with the diversity of 
community members.   
Our interest is in how to handle potential disputes about reasoning practice within a group 
discussion, and this takes us beyond the concurrent debate about whether group reasoning can 
match or improve upon individual reasoning (Dacey, 2020). In an extensively-researched paper, 
Dacey reviews the “interactionist” perspective on reasoning, concluding that even where suboptimal 
reasoning is offered in a group context, the communication may nevertheless help to counter 
individual reasoning biases and the overall result of the group deliberation may still meet standards 
for good reasoning and in some cases improve on individual reasoning.  This is a significant step 
away from viewing the assessment of evidence, persuasion, and justification of reasoning as 
primarily an individual skill and responsibility.  Interactionism positions reasoning as "an evolved 
adaptation with a social, communicative function: producing arguments to justify one’s positions and 
evaluating the arguments of others” (Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, 2011, 2017, as cited by Dacey, 
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49). The focus is still on good reasoning results, but these results will sometimes not coincide 
with the best possible reasoning by each individual member of the group.  Group discussion in 
education is a natural and effective component of improving reasoning.  Dacey maintains that the 
“apparent tension between group-level outcomes and agent-level outcomes can be addressed by 
recognizing the phenomenon of agent success via group success. Typically, when a group reasons 
well together, its members are epistemic beneficiaries” (69). 
We follow this line of reasoning in so far as it affirms that group reasoning can be an 
indispensable component of successful reasoning.  However, Dacey’s focus appears to be on 
groups whose members who have compatible beliefs about what argument should achieve.  For 
example, they would all acknowledge that bias is undesirable.  Our concern is with groups whose 
members may have divergent or incompatible beliefs about evidence or rational persuasion. For 
example, they may disagree about whether it is appropriate to share personal experience. 
Diversity of beliefs may not be explicit.  Dacey acknowledges that “dialogic environments 
are often influenced by structural features—such as cultural norms or technological nudges—that 
may be outside of members’ immediate awareness or control” (63), He does not directly develop any 
suggestions as to how these influences may be brought to awareness or reconciled if they are 
inconsistent.  
We’ve found it helpful to draw on the concept of an “argument culture”, as defined by 
Zarefsky (2009) in “What does an Argument Culture Look like?” We use this concept to 
highlight how the dialogic environment impacts whether diversity is accepted by the group, and 
we explore how the concept of an argument culture helps one interpret children’s practice of 
reasoning in group discussion.   
When children are invited to reason in groups in the classroom, they are not assumed to be 
members of any specific “argument culture”.  To the extent that they come to share any 
particular set of argumentation procedures and standards of judgment, they are part of the 
creation of an argument culture in which they can function.    We want to open the question of 
whether the development of an “argument culture” among children is a “co-creation” of a new 
argument culture or is an educational practice for membership in an existing argument culture.  
Raising this question in turn should indicate how groups can welcome and benefit from the 
individual diversity which is already present in our communities, without imposing specific 
argumentation practices which may disadvantage some participants. We will be looking at when 
and why we might want to see children as a paradigm of diversity in argument, rather than as 
outliers on our existing spectrum of adults who  may vary in their expectations and practices. 
 
2. Developing argument practices for adults and children  
In order to build and develop an “argument culture”, either for children or for adults, a core 
question will be whether there are specific argument practices and reasoning standards they 
should be encouraged to adopt.  It is tempting for anyone already skilled in the practices of one 
argument community to assume that those practices are “best practices” and should be 
encouraged among learners who are new to argument. Back when informal logic in universities 
and Philosophy for Children in the K-12 system were just getting off the ground, in the early 
1970s, there was an unequivocal answer to what standards of reasoning to use: reasoning must be 
based on formal logic. Practices must be based on scientific objectivity and impartiality: it is the 
testimony and reasoning that matters, not the sentiments and personality of the reasoner. This 
answer has been challenged and increasingly refined in the decades since then. The 
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developments have opened up the question of how to balance sufficient consistency in what we 
mean by “argument” against the diversity we may find across argumentation practices in 
different dialogical contexts.    
Zarefsky (2009) explores exactly this balance in describing an “argument culture”, which is 
not necessarily co-extensive with any community of shared ethnicity, religion, discipline, or 
geographical boundaries, but does engage collaboratively in argument following consistent 
practices. We are using “culture” and “community” almost interchangeably here. We take the 
“culture” to be the shared practices, and the group which shares those practices to be the 
“community”.   
In a classroom, it is clear that we do expect children to have to learn how to engage in 
reasoned discussion.  In Philosophy for Children this learning is typically achieved through a 
group process. The core of Lipman’s method is the community of philosophical inquiry. 
Children’s thinking skills are developed and improved upon through dialogue on philosophical 
inquiry questions. The role of the adult is one of facilitator. Children are presented with stimulus 
material (in Lipman’s program this is a reading from a philosophical novel, but stimulus material 
now includes picture books, film, poetry, and games) and then are asked to formulate their own 
questions. A question is chosen (usual by vote) and then an inquiry into the question is 
conducted through the children’s own discussion. The child acts as an individual agent within the 
group, and the members of the group must take one another seriously in responding to their 
contributions. The adult facilitator does not tell the children how to answer the question, but 
helps to keep the inquiry on track by encouraging children to give and expand upon the reasons 
for their answers, offer examples and counter examples, and critically engage with each other’s 
arguments.  A similar technique is used in instruction in critical thinking.  Such instructional 
groups are defined as a “Community of Inquiry” (CoI), or “Community of Philosophical 
Inquiry” (CPI) if the topic is philosophical.  The use of the word “community” signals not only 
that it is a group discussion, but also that the group members have some sense of shared interests 
and objectives in pursuing the topic of discussion. The more cohesive and sustainable a 
community, the more likely it is that it can develop a shared and effective practice of 
argumentation: an argument culture. 
A CoI/CPI is a community in both a fragile and a robust sense. It is a robust community in 
so far as a consistent group of children are able to explore reasoned thinking over time, without 
externally-imposed criteria for what they must say or think. There is no evidence they must 
consider other than what is presented by members of the community, and no conclusion they 
must be persuaded by. They can collectively evolve their standards and practices by striking a 
balance that works for them between encouraging maximum diversity of individual expression 
and maintaining the level of harmony needed to continue group discussion.  The levels of 
harmony and trust become particularly important if a decision must be made as a result of group 
deliberation, because the group may have to handle significant differences in opinion or 
procedural preferences (Kloster 2019). 
It is a fragile community in so far as the minute the discussion ends, the group disbands. Its 
members return to their classrooms and homes, to other “cultures” and communities – in which, 
typically, their teachers, parents, and other adults are the authorities. The children's ability to 
weigh evidence rationally and muster persuasive arguments might have no influence at all 
outside the classroom even if the children as individuals have internalized traditional reasoning 
skills that are meant to be transferable. 
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The strong contrast between the effective functioning of a community of children and its 
fragility relative to the wider communities in which the children must also operate is a valuable 
test case for whether argumentation culture creates a community, strengthens an existing 
community, or simply reflects processes and standards individuals should internalize to apply 
across communities of practice.  
Our first question must be whether a children’s Community of Inquiry meets the criteria for 
an argument culture.   Zarefsky (2009) defines an “argument culture” as a community or a subset 
of a community, with shared practices which include argument at some times and places.  Even 
across diversity, Zareksky identifies commonalities between communities that use argument to 
reason with one another.  The six key features these communities generally share are: the 
presence and importance of an audience, acknowledgment and possible embrace of uncertainty, 
valuing conviction even in the face of uncertainty, justifying claims rather than proving them, 
being co-operative even if apparently adversarial in tone or procedure, and risk-taking in being 
willing to be shown wrong and to change their beliefs, including being willing to lose face if 
unsuccessful in their attempts to persuade others. 
A strong argument culture is also characterized by experiencing at least five productive 
tensions, between: commitment and contingency, partisanship and restraint, personal conviction 
and sensitivity to the audience, reasonableness and subjectivity, and decision and non-closure. 
Differences in how communities manage these tensions explain why there are multiple argument 
cultures and, hence, why we need to understand arguing both within and among different 
cultures.  
These features and tensions are jointly an ideal, but not necessarily an abstract ideal. They 
are achieved in some times and places, and may not look the same in all cases.  His definition 
allows for the precise standards to vary across communities, and for the communities to be 
temporary as well as on-going. Diverse cultures may have distinct practices: for example, the 
Uzbek farmers studied by Luria (1976) could make logical inferences just as Russians would, but 
they refused to draw even a hypothetical inference if it had to be based on information about 
places they had not experienced personally, such as the distant mountains or the north of Russia.  
The Uzbeks and the Russians both have argument cultures, but those argument cultures differ in 
important respects, such as the Uzbeks’ unwillingness to be persuaded by logic in the absence of 
evidence from their own experience.  
The key step in considering the development of an argument culture is that the people who 
are to participate do not come to the culture as blank slates.  If there can be multiple argument 
cultures, then individuals from one argument culture may find themselves in discussion with 
individuals from other cultures. Each of those individuals, children included, will come to the 
discussion with some background experience in what the people they live with usually do and 
say.  Any teacher or facilitator charged with helping to develop an argument culture then faces 
the dilemma of whether to turn them away from their current practices towards a “better” model, 
or try to integrate their existing practices.  Luria concluded the Uzbeks were in need of a good 
Russian education, which may indeed have helped them to participate in the Russian culture 
imposed on them as a Soviet Socialist Republic. This kind of cross-cultural participation is often 
what we have in mind when we educate children or train adults in improving their reasoning 
skills: we don’t want them to be limited to functioning within some specific group or 
community. We want them to be able to transfer their reasoning skills to other contexts in which 
good argumentation may be important. However, the imposition of standards from one 
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community on another are no longer automatically accepted, and “cross-cultural” participation is 
clearly not the only aim of establishing an “argument culture”.  
Philosophy for Children’s Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CPI) meets the criteria for 
an argument culture. It is a group process, so the audience is present. The use of a facilitator to 
guide discussion ensures that it is co-operative, claims are justified, and risk-taking and 
uncertainty are modelled and encouraged.  How it negotiates the five “productive tensions” will 
be examined in the next section, in which we will consider examples that show that all five 
tensions are certainly experienced.  
 The original design of P4C leant towards helping children prepare for the existing argument 
culture of analytic philosophy. The educational theory Lipman used to support this method is 
found in Dewey, Peirce, and Vygotsky (Lipman, 2003). The general idea is that by experiencing 
thinking in community, children will ultimately internalize the reasoning moves used by the 
community. In this way, children will learn to consider different perspectives, develop the habits 
of considering the reasons for their beliefs, and reflect critically on their own arguments and the 
arguments of others. This is entirely compatible with the type of interactionism described by 
Dacey (2020): a group of children, not themselves expert reasoners, can nevertheless reason well 
as a group with the right roles and facilitation. However, the adequacy of the reasoning is judged 
by its conformity to standards of reasoning established by a wider community, in this case the 
background standards of reasoning developed over the twentieth century by logicians both 
formal and informal.    
This is no longer the only possible interpretation of what a P4C community of inquiry is 
doing or should be doing.  P4C became popular worldwide, and its curriculum expanded to cover 
the entire range from K-12, and to cover philosophical topics from ethics to aesthetics.  As it 
became obvious that children could and did engage in cogent discussion of a wide range of 
philosophical topics, the P4C movement itself diverged in its expectations of discussion.  
Questions about the goals of philosophy for children began to arise. Were children simply 
practicing reasoned discussion as preparation for democratic citizenship in an adult society, for 
the sake of their future autonomy, to facilitate their own philosophy and philosophical 
experiences, or a combination of all these things and more? The question which remains as a 
result of this development is whether it is reasonable to consider a children’s community of 
inquiry as an argument culture of its own and one in which a diversity of voices and community 
relative to reasoning practices is essential. 
For example, one of the authors (Anderson) experienced a recent community of inquiry with 
a kindergarten class using a lesson plan created by the Philosophy Foundation (Worley and 
Worley, 2007). The children were discussing a scenario in which at different times, two different 
toys found the same boat on a pond. They each used the boat to sail around the pond. They each 
loved the boat. They each thought the boat belonged to them.  In this case, the opening inquiry 
question was provided to the class: who did the boat belong to? After some initial airing of 
different positions, they started testing hypotheses based on various principles. One child said 
that when she outgrew her clothes then they didn’t belong to her, they belonged to her sister. So, 
she suggested, the boat belonged to the person who could best fit in it because thing belong to 
those they fit. A classmate responded with a counter example. He said that he could fit in his 
parents’ bed, but it didn’t belong to him. Other hypotheses were offered and tested. For example, 
one response was that because they shared nicely, it belonged to both of them. Another child said 
that his mother told him everything belongs to God. So, the boat didn’t belong to either toy. It 
must belong to God. The majority of the children in the group were five years old and had no 
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trouble testing universal claims and applying them to individual instances. They also listened 
carefully to each other and responded to each other’s ideas. They were eager to discuss the issue.  
In this dialogue, we can see clear examples of subjective interpretations of a concept: things 
belong to those they fit, or to those who will share them nicely.  We also see clear examples of 
logical inference – if everything belongs to God, the boat must belong to God, as well as the 
counter-example, fitting into your parents’ bed doesn’t make it belong to you.  The children 
practiced reasoning skills that are used in adult argument cultures. However, they were also 
creating one of their own. Their argument culture did not require closure, but did allow for the 
testing of personal conviction and balanced sensitivity to audience against personal conviction in 
their openness and patience in listening and encouraging each other to speak.  
One of the authors (Kloster) experienced a similar discussion in a first year philosophy 
seminar.  The majority of students, born and educated in Canada, were discussing ownership as 
if it must mean personal possession and exclusive right to use the item. An international student 
from Asia expressed surprise.  As far as he was concerned, the sound system in his parents’ 
living room was just as much “his” as “theirs”. Neither exclusive use nor individual possession 
mattered when the family was the basic unit of ownership. In this seminar, the whole aim was to 
manage Zarefsky’s “decision vs. non-closure” tension: to alert students to the existence and 
defensibility of world-views other than their own. The Asian student’s intervention was a very 
welcome correction to the course of the debate, opening up ways to make the group aware of the 
other tensions they should be managing. 
However, that student’s willingness to express his view showed he had already become 
versed in North American group reasoning practices. He was willing to speak up in a group and 
to offer a personal opinion that clashed with the evident majority view.  Neither of these moves 
is routine in Asian cultures, where deference to a teacher’s expertise often inhibits any form of 
group discussion.   
 Here is a crucial problem for managing group diversity in reasoning.  At the time, the 
instructor was “teaching reasoning” of a recognizable logical type: building into the discussion 
expectations for exactly the kinds of contributions she herself had learned to make in high school 
and university. Those principles of “critical thinking” are exactly the ones that may build in the 
implicit bias towards masculine norms and equal willingness to speak up that are now challenged 
by feminist and other scholars (Dacey, 2020).  The diversity in K-12 and post-secondary 
classrooms means we do need to rethink which norms we are relying on and be open to very 
different ways of facilitating the learning of reasoning (Kloster, 2017). 
Unlike the Uzbeks and other ethnic groups such as the Kpelle, who were studied precisely 
because they had reached adulthood without a state-imposed education, most students have 
already to some extent been socialized by their K-12 education into some practices that are 
standard in that education system. This makes it easy to underestimate their diversity of 
background and experience.   Both authors teach in a Canadian university that welcomes 
international students and has a local community with at least three distinct ethnic and religious 
cultures: indigenous, evangelical Christians of European ethnic origin, and Sikhs of South Asian 
ethnic origin.  The argument practices appear to be different in each culture, and different from a 
“Western” logical or scientific argument practice.  This diversity is common in Canadian 
communities.  When there is diversity in a community, it is arguable whether the best 
instructional approach is to inculcate reasoning practices and standards as already established in 
Canadian philosophy departments.  Both authors have experienced the different participation 
patterns of students coming to our university from Christian high schools and from schools in 
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India, all of whom are far less willing to challenge authority than students educated in Canadian 
public schools.  Students educated in India, however, typically are more comfortable with logical 
and scientific thinking than indigenous students may be.  Christian and Sikh students are both 
comfortable with the idea and structure of schools, where indigenous people have good reason to 
be suspicious that the school system does not have their best interests at heart or respect their 
reasoning preferences. 
Indigenous students are recognized in Canada as having not only a distinctive argument 
culture, but a right not to be required to conform to academic practices derived from Western 
European tradition.  Their distinctive argument culture includes use of narrative, speaking 
subjectively, weighing personal experience and age heavily as evidence, and reaching decisions 
by consensus rather than majority vote.   
All of these indigenous argument practices clash with Canadian practices in science and in 
the law. Science and law are both “argument cultures”, similar but not identical in what evidence 
they accept and what practices they bring to persuasion. Indigenous ways of giving testimony, 
sentencing, and seeing the value of bringing a case to court at all are at odds with the Canadian 
legal system as it is currently.  (See, for example, Ross, 2006, for an example of an Anglo-
Canadian lawyer coming to terms with practice in northern Ontario communities.) 
That makes it interesting to contrast the evolution of P4C in K-12 education with a different 
level and type of training in “argument culture”. Law is in an important sense both a community 
of practice, and an argumentation community. It meets all Zarefsky’s six key features and 
exercises them in dealing with all five productive tensions. It is a sustainable culture, and 
although it evolves, it does not allow its trainees to co-create its practices.  Law students are 
adults who are educated in a specific mode of argument, during training in which they are not 
initially expected to be expert. Co-construction of knowledge may happen when law students and 
an instructor work through a case study, but the way they present their reasoning is governed by 
pre-existing standards. Legal argument is a mode with highly specific requirements for evidence, 
and in which the evidence needs to persuade only the judge or jury. (In contrast to the lawyers 
and judge, a jury can co-create its argument practices. Consensus must be reached, but the 
precise rules of engagement remain largely within the jury as long as they weigh evidence only 
as they have been instructed by the judge.) Instruction in the practice of legal argument will be 
teacher-led, to draw students into the existing community. Its practices are determined by its goal 
of even-handed application of the law.  Each legal system will be in effect a different sub-
community, as reflected by the need for lawyers who have qualified in one system to pass the bar 
again in a new system if they wish to practice there.   
The contrast between education in legal argument and education in reasoning for children 
illustrates some potential differences in handling Zarefsky’s “productive tensions”.  For example, 
the law requires that litigators be partisans for their clients, while judges must remain impartial: 
the impartiality of the system is achieved by permitting maximum partisanship on opposite sides, 
weighed by an impartial authority.  Children are expected to be less than partisan but also less 
than impartial: to begin perhaps as partisans of their own views but to move towards impartiality 
as they learn more.  The law requires that reasonableness dominate over subjectivity; children’s 
discussion tolerates both. 
In this section, we have explored how diverse groups can have diverse “argument cultures”, 
and we have examined the “argument culture” of P4C as it compares to other cultural practices 
of argument and to education in law as an “argument culture”.  Thinking in terms of argument 
culture allows us to consider how diverse argument practices can be between and even within a 
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wider culture. For example, we have indicated that the community of legal reasoners and the 
communities of indigenous people can have difficulty working together.  The examples of the 
kindergarden children and the Asian student discussing “ownership” are an indication that it is 
not obvious any single set of pre-existing reasoning standards and practices can be imposed to 
help settle their differences of opinion through reason. For such groups, how would we work 
towards a mutually-acceptable and workable definition of who owns what?  In the next section, 
we will consider how education might handle recognition of diversity in the learners’ 
backgrounds and experiences. 
3.  Dilemmas of diversity 
As indicated in the previous section, a dilemma for education in reasoning is whether to 
encourage only some specific set of practices or whether to increase diversity by exploring new 
practices.  In this section, we will consider how P4C suggests options for exploring new 
practices, and in particular, options for co-creating of reasoning practices by a group. By “co-
creation”, we have in mind something more than “co-construction” of knowledge. Co-
construction of knowledge is a group achievement in reaching understanding on a particular 
topic. It is based upon collaboratively examining and weighing evidence to resolve a doubt or 
settle an issue (Rapanta, 2019, 9 and 11).  Co-creation of reasoning permits not just the reasons 
but the practices of argument to vary from previous or external standards, in accordance with 
what the group members collectively are comfortable with as evidence and as techniques of 
persuasion. 
Research in P4C (see Lipman, 2003) has shown that children have competence both as 
individual arguers (measured against traditional standards) and as members of a group. We 
would add that these groups become an argument culture of their own as defined by Zarefsky (by 
showing flexibility, respect for difference, ability to create trust, and be a receptive audience in 
ways not often experienced by children in adult argument cultures). 
As indicated in the previous section, in a CPI, the children’s thinking skills are developed 
and improved upon through dialogue on philosophical inquiry questions. One or more adults 
may be present in the group, but the role of an adult is one of facilitator. Children are presented 
with stimulus material and then are asked to formulate their own questions. A question is chosen 
(usually by vote) and then an inquiry into the question is conducted through the children’s own 
discussion. The adult facilitator does not tell the children how to answer the question, but helps 
to keep the inquiry on track by encouraging children to give and expand upon the reasons for 
their answers, offer examples and counter examples, and critically engage with each other’s 
arguments. Lipman’s curriculum did include exercise sets and practice questions to use outside 
of the community of inquiry dialogue, however, direct teaching of critical thinking skills is 
generally avoided now. There are varying versions of what the facilitator may do: e.g., in some 
versions, the facilitator may paraphrase a child’s remark to confirm understanding. In other 
versions, the facilitator may not paraphrase anyone else’s remarks in order not to risk seeming 
like an authority. This illustrates the core dilemma: is the facilitator’s role to guide group 
members to better use of adult reasoning standards, or is the facilitator’s role limited strictly to 
social leadership such as maintaining respectful behaviour and staying on topic?  
Under any type of leadership and facilitation, to the extent that this philosophical learning is 
done in groups, it is done by groups as much as by each individual within the group.  A group is 
not automatically just a subset of an existing argument culture.  It might be, if the group is 
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homogenous and if the group has been brought together for a particular purpose by that argument 
culture. Leadership and facilitation by an adult who is encouraging a particular set of existing 
argument practices would be an example of treating the group as a subset of that adult’s existing 
argument culture.  For example, a high school law class might practice debate using teacher-
guided legal standards for evidence and persuasion. However, where the group is diverse, and 
can direct its own behavior, it can also develop its own argument culture. For example, the 
kindergarden class discussing ownership does not need to determine legal possession of the boat. 
The group is free to explore wherever discussion takes it. Group members are learning about the 
variety of opinions and positions on a topic.  As they learn, they are free to develop their own 
practices for handling evidence, subject only to mutual respect. .  Participants are expected only 
to be open to modifying what they say and how they think as a result of their participation.   
In any format in which the facilitator must refrain from leading and directing, the evidence a 
group uses, the standards by which it is assessed, the forms of persuasion they use and the 
effectiveness with which they persuade others are all open to evolution as the discussion 
continues.  This evolution can be, then, a matter of the group’s choices as members react to one 
another’s contributions.  It need not reflect any particular choices of roles or types of facilitation 
in order to produce “the best” reasoning.   
This discussion is not unique to P4C.  Rapanta, in“Argument as Critically Oriented 
Discourse” (2019) defines “criticality” as the measure of effective argumentation practice as 
observed in a classroom process. Her examples are taken from biology, physics, and history, and 
their key features are mutual sharing of knowledge, exploring or elaborating that knowledge, or 
even co-creating knowledge with the teacher.  Any expertise the teacher has in the subject matter 
is presented as an invitation to further discussion, not as a conclusion to be accepted uncritically. 
The challenge for the teacher in these dialogues is to rethink what it means to be an “expert” or 
“authority”.  One example shows a teacher wanting to use regulatory authority to cut short a 
discussion for lack of time, yet quickly conceding the legitimacy of the student’s inquiry and 
facilitating the continuation of discussion (Rapanta 2019, 21-22).  The teacher’s contributions in 
the extended discussion hover between welcoming the students’ interest in the topic and 
providing her own examples that could sum up what has been said, so the discussion can be 
ended. Rapanta considers this an example of the teacher manifesting authority not through 
regulation but through her use of argumentative discourse. Rapanta concludes that if children are 
to learn to think critically, The teacher’s level of expertise in some already-approved 
argumentation practices (i.e. “culturally accepted” for some argument culture) must not be 
permitted to limit the children to only those approved practices. Even when the group focus is on 
co-construction of knowledge in established disciplines, the actual practices in the group can 
diverge from existing models  
This is not a tension exclusive to groups of children in an educational context.  One reason 
that P4C experience illuminates diversity in general is that there is a very similar concern related 
to groups of diverse adults who are also not expected to be skilled reasoners when they start 
deliberating.  As noted earlier, in deliberative/"direct" democracy, groups of adult citizens 
engage in dialogue to provide recommendations on public policy. Typically, these adults are 
chosen precisely for their diversity.  They must represent the range of opinions and experiences 
in their community, in order for it to be useful to bring them together as a manageable subset of 
the community.  These adult participants are not required to meet all the standards of logical or 
scientific reasoning that may predominate in their community.  They are required to hear 
evidence and use persuasion to reach a decision the group considers reasonable.  They have to 
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have enough confidence in their reasoning to be willing to make their recommendations to the 
community at large.  Their freedom to deliberate as they wish highlights the tension between 
preferring existing norms of argument and permitting new forms to emerge.  For example, 
existing norms of reasoning, influenced by science, suggests that the citizens should weigh 
heavily the evidence provided to them by scientists and that they should be objective in weighing 
this evidence. Experts are often provided to present information or to be available to answer 
questions.   However, to the despair of their expert advisors (for example, Archer, 2012), the 
group deliberations appear not to weigh expert advice adequately. They appear to focus on 
mutual persuasion. They may have group facilitators, but the facilitation is even less likely to 
impose explicit standards than a teacher facilitating an educational dialogue. When an expert 
steps in to influence the direction of the group’s thinking, it can be detrimental to the functioning 
of the group (for example, by dominating the discussion: Sprain et al. 2012) 
Archer (2012) noted that in the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review that she observed, the 
citizen deliberators were critically wary of the experts, recognizing that experts were not 
necessarily objective. They also showed concern if the experts “didn’t show enough goodwill 
toward them or respect for the task at hand” (57). The reasoning practices of the OCIR 
deliberations included “mediating interactions between experts and citizens, providing ample 
time for citizens’ questions, and giving citizens time for discussion without experts present” (60).  
Archer notes that this fits John Dewey’s model for citizen collaboration: “the CIR gave experts 
the responsibility of informing citizens and placed the onus for deliberation on the citizens 
themselves (60).  Under these circumstances, the citizens proved more than adequately 
responsible for collecting and weighing scientific and statistical evidence appropriately, even 
though they were not explicitly instructed that they must do so. 
To the extent that the citizen groups function as a community and not just as an ad hoc 
collection of individuals, we want to respect the development of the community as an argument 
culture even while its members are still learning how to deliberate. In the OCIR process, the 
citizens accepted the significance of expert evidence without accepting the standard “authority” 
role for the experts themselves, so their procedure was not the same as their facilitators might 
have expected.  It is in effect a “co-creation” of argument practices for a diverse community. 
Without disregarding the value of argument cultures which rely on existing standards of 
reasoning, evidence, and persuasion, we can and should also be open to hearing different 
reasoning voices and exploring new possibilities.  Transforming a reasoning culture does not 
always happen strictly within an existing paradigm. At the heart of all practices of Philosophy for 
Children is the recognition that children are capable of reasoning together and reasoning well 
about both abstract and applied philosophical issues. Convincing adults that children are not only 
capable of thinking rationally, but of engaging in philosophy has been a struggle from the 
beginning of the movement. However, the children do reason collaboratively, as the citizen 
groups do. Moreover, the collaborative reasoning often employs standards specific to the 
argument culture created by the individual children in the community, just as the citizen groups 
employed a non-standard approach to handling expert evidence. And since children come to their 
reasoning practice with far less commitment to existing adult practices, they may be more likely 
to create new practices. 
For example, in one discussion, a boy aged about 10 said he was concerned that he might be 
like the bully in the story the group had just read. He said there was a kid who wanted to hang 
out with him and his friends, but they didn’t want him. The only way they get him to go away 
was to be mean to him. He seemed to see himself as the victim in this situation. As the other 
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children in the group discussed his situation, they did not question his interpretation of himself as 
the victim, although they did show concern for the child who was being excluded.  They tried to 
find a solution that would be best for everyone without judging either child.   
It would be very easy in a discussion like this for the facilitator to import adult standards of 
reasoning, and encourage the children to be more consistent in recognizing that they could not 
simultaneously condemn the bully in the story and accept the child in the group whose own 
experience turned out to be remarkably similar.  Equally, with experience of adult reasoning, it is 
tempting to look for more objectivity by the group and by the boy himself in analysing his 
behaviour.  
Yet if the facilitator refrains from imposing judgment and objectivity, the reasoning 
continues with a focus on caring. Caring is more important than consistency to this group. As the 
discussion continued, the focus on caring led to concrete suggestions for how to handle the 
problem, and these suggestions were just as workable and just as defensible as solutions that 
might have come from a more objective analysis.  More than that, it was possible for the 
discussion to continue amicably. If a group member had said, “But your behaviour is exactly like 
the bully in the story, so you are a bully”, this would have violated the group’s apparent principle 
that they should not make inferences that would be hurtful to anyone actually present.    
This might be a case of this group drifting away from acceptable standards of reasoning, or 
it might be a case of co-creation of a different standard. To decide the issue, we should recognize 
that there are two separate questions here: 1. Should the child recognize that he is indeed a bully? 
and 2. Should he hear it in and from this group?   
At this point, applying standards of logical consistency to group members’ statements 
connects directly to the same issue of possible inconsistency as it arises in reasoning practices by 
adults in different cultures.  James Hamill, in Ethno-Logic (1990) notes that his Navajo test 
subjects, who were fully bilingual in English and Navajo, counted the statement “You are tall or 
you are short” as true in English but false in Navajo. The inconsistency is accounted for by the 
social unacceptability in Navajo of asserting anything directly of the person to whom one is 
speaking. The balance between “reasonableness and subjectivity” is different than in English.  
Here too, we could hypothesize that caring takes precedence over consistency.  
What is important in the children’s discussion is that as it actually flowed, it resulted in 
concrete suggestions for how this boy could engage fairly with the child he did not like. For 
example, they suggested the child could tell the boy he could play with them if he didn’t engage 
in the unwanted behaviour, or that the child could speak to the teacher to find out if there were 
other classmates who would play with the boy. Whether the other children failed to recognize 
him as a bully or simply refused to openly identify him as one, they made it possible for him to 
see a way through his dilemma.  His participation in this argument culture was not just an 
opportunity to develop his personal reasoning skills, but the opportunity to develop ways to 
improve his skills in interacting with people outside the group.  The group’s ability to co-create 
standards for their argumentation/reasoning actually allows for genuine dialogue and hearing one 
another’s voices. 
We take this example to indicate that even though the group had been brought together for 
training in reasoning, the function of such a group is intrinsically multifaceted.  In the process of 
learning respectful ways to contribute to the argument, its members are also building respectful 
relationships and practising new social skills that contribute to the creation of their own 
argument culture.  
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Another example came from a surprising statement made by a girl in a group discussion 
about the book “A Gift of Nothing”.  This girl said in the group that she would be okay receiving 
a gift of nothing because friends were more important. However, when the observer (Anderson) 
asked the child afterwards if she’d really be happy with nothing, the girl replied, “Oh, no. That’s 
just what I said in there.”  Again, this is inconsistency, and perhaps of a more problematic kind. 
On the one hand, it indicates that context is driving the child’s behaviour rather than the child 
internalizing a concept of consistency. On the other hand, the observed group discussion had 
gone well, and to the extent that the girl’s contribution was less genuine than it might have been, 
it served both to keep the group open to new possibilities, and also to let her test what kinds of 
contributions she could safely make.  The group she was in was at that point only beginning to 
shape itself as a community.  For an argument culture to operate, it has to have more than one 
dialogue, and it is not unreasonable that the tension between personal conviction and sensitivity 
to audience may change as members of the group begin to understand how open they can be with 
one another.  
If we compare her comment to the other group’s reluctance to name a bully, it may seem 
that in both cases the children are prone to mere surface politeness or insincerity. The facilitator 
might want to move the group in the direction of expressing their personal convictions more 
honestly.  But these two examples can equally well be interpreted as setting out standards for 
acceptable reasoning steps that will move the inquiry forward. As one of us has argued elsewhere 
(Kloster, 2019) this amounts to affirming that for a group to discuss topics on which the 
members disagree, we cannot set reasoning standards first and leave the social aspects of 
reasoning, such as how to establish trust, until after we’ve resolved everything else.  These social 
aspects may be a key component for differences between argument cultures that may have 
similar reasoning standards but very different practices to express them, as for the English and 
Navajo cited by Hamill. 
The contrast between different options for the facilitator, and the difficulties in becoming a 
good facilitator, are a reminder that it begs the question to assume that the adult is “the expert” or 
that an expert is solely responsible for what happens in the group.  The examples of discussions 
by diverse participants reveal that the use of expert evidence, open identification of 
inconsistencies or contradictions, and empathetic rather than objective responses can all be 
varied within a specific group without the group losing its standing as an “argument culture”.  
Both the educational and adult citizen contexts indicate that the opportunity to evolve diverse 
reasoning practices is not limited only to expert reasoners.  
We contend that as soon as an educator or other expert group leader becomes aware that the 
group is diverse, then it also becomes important to let the group members guide their own 
reasoning process.  The development of reasoning skills and argumentation practices is about the 
participants, not just about the facilitator’s own skills. 
4.  Conclusion: argument cultures as co-creation   
We have argued in the preceding section that facilitating reasoning in groups of children or 
adults requires recognition of their diversity as individuals, and so building an argument culture 
is not simply a matter of introducing these reasoners to a pre-existing set of “best practices”.  
Any newly-formed group of reasoners will provide a complex mix of expertise, background, and 
social practices.  While in some cases it may be appropriate to direct that group towards a 
common set of argument practices and social practices, there will also be cases in which the 
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group should be free to co-create its own practices and relationships. Even inexpert reasoners can 
and do evolve argument cultures.  Perhaps one way to honour diversity in general is to stop 
thinking about participation in argument as directed only towards respecting existing argument 
cultures, and to recognize that it can also involve developing anyone’s ability to co-create 
argument cultures across a diversity of participants and goals. To evolve these group practices, 
they may need the assistance of a facilitator.  However, what is crucial to good facilitation is not 
the imposition of the facilitator’s own reasoning skill, but the facilitator’s ability to lead without 
leading. The facilitator not only needs to rethink the nature of “authority” (Rapanta, 2019), but 
also to reconsider what it is to “facilitate” when there is no pre-established procedure to be 
facilitated.  Some theorists have suggested approaching facilitation with appropriate epistemic 
humility in order to avoid epistemic injustice against children. Thus, facilitators are encouraged 
to allow the ‘newness’ of children’s approaches to reasoning and answering philosophical 
questions and to develop methods that will allow children’s voices to actually be heard.  
The facilitator may have to practice humility and avoid giving undue weight to the 
facilitator’s voice either as a teacher or just as an older person. In general, to help eliminate 
unconscious bias towards any type of person, type of contribution, or existing standard of 
reasoning, members of socially dominant groups may need to remember to invite contributions 
from others before offering their own comments, and to ensure they have understood before 
offering any judgments. 
The key element here is being open to newness.  The facilitator may have to discover new 
ways to encourage and develop discussion. The group members may have to look for new ways 
to express their thoughts and new rhythms for introducing their contributions, in order to become 
a functioning group that can not only explore difficult topics but where necessary agree on 
conclusions or recommendations. 
The group process might constrain how and when a viewpoint may be expressed, but it does 
not – and should not – blur or transform the individual’s freedom to hold a particular viewpoint 
unless persuaded otherwise. Diverse individuals with distinct identities contribute to the variety 
of viewpoints expressed in the group, yet the group has a shared identity such that the practices 
and deliberations of the group become the responsibility and co-creation of the group as a whole. 
Where adults differ from children is in having a much clearer entitlement to participate in 
reasoning.  If we accept that children have the ability to engage in rational thought and rational 
argument, that they have perspectives and criticisms, and experiences to draw on that adults may 
not, it follows that it is also worthwhile searching for ways to hear what they have to say for the 
sake of inclusion.  
Even if one does not see participation in adult group reasoning as a moral demand, children 
have a legal right to free expression and participation that has existed in Canada at least since the 
ratification of the UNCRC in 1991. If we stop thinking about education in reasoning as directed 
only towards initiating children into adult argument cultures we can recognize that they are 
capable of co-creating argument cultures with each other and with adults. Co-creation of 
adult/child argument cultures is what will allow them the voice and participation that is their 
right. 
We have argued that argumentation is, for children as much as for adults, a group process 
whose effectiveness is determined not primarily by the individual’s ability to apply reasoning 
elsewhere but by the group’s ability to deliberate using a reasoned process.  If group practice in 
argumentation is used only to develop and assess the skills and dispositions of individual 
participants, then it misunderstands and misses out on a key element of what argumentation is: a 
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“cultural” or community practice.  If the group does not conform to existing reasoning practices 
as measured by recognized tests, the group can take responsibility for creating, testing, and 
implementing its own standards of acceptable reasoning. 
We are proposing that the focus of developing group argumentation will always have to 
include ways to promote the success of the group at meeting its own needs for respectful 
deliberation and decision-making.  Whatever skills a person brings to argument from previous 
experience, these skills are likely to need modification for the specific group and context in 
which argument happens.   
We need to recognize the depth of the problem of building a culture of practicing reason in 
and for a community, where the community is diverse and where it includes both adults and 
children.  Tempting as it might be to rely on pre-existing standards for “good reasoning”, it is 
even more important to stay open to the possibilities of co-creation of new combinations of 
practice and emphasis.  Children, no less than adults, are important participants in this co-
creation of new insights into reasoning. Using principles of accommodating diversity, a group 
can co-create the standards of evidence and methods of persuasion that would permit children 
and adults to participate as equals in reasoned discussions beyond the classroom. 
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